Recent Medicare legislation has been directed at improving patient care quality by stopping reimbursement of hospital-acquired conditions (HACs). However, this policy may be undermined if some providers respond by upcoding, a practice where HACs are reported as present-on-admission (POA) to continue receiving full reimbursement. Identifying upcoding behavior from claims data is challenging due to unobservable confounders. Our approach leverages state-level variations in adverse event reporting regulations and instrumental variable techniques to discover contradictions between HAC and POA reporting rates that are strongly suggestive of upcoding. We find over 11,000 upcoded infections a year, resulting in an added cost burden of $200 million.
Introduction
Hospital-acquired conditions (HACs), defined as conditions, infections, or complications developed by patients as a consequence of medical treatment in a hospital, place a huge burden on society. In 2002 alone, there were an estimated 1.7 million HACs in the U.S., which contributed an estimated 98,987 deaths, placing HACs among the leading causes of deaths for that year (Klevens et al. 2007 ).
In addition, official estimates by the Centers for Disease Prevention and Control (CDC) estimate the direct economic cost of HACs to be between $28 to $34 billion annually (Scott 2009 ).
Evidence has shown that most of these HACs are preventable through the use of better clinical practices (see, e.g., Berenholtz et al. 2004 , Berriel-Cass et al. 2006 . However, until recently, Medicare's fee-for-service model reimbursed healthcare providers for these conditions regardless of 2 Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
whether or not they were due to an avoidable lapse in the provider's quality of care. Furthermore, Hsu et al. (2014) found that providers could increase their margins over eight-fold for a given ICU patient if he or she incurred a HAC, since the patient would require an extended stay and more services. This creates perverse incentives for providers to increase HAC rates.
This issue was addressed by the Center of Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) through the HAC nonpayment policy (starting on October 1, 2008), which incentivized providers to invest in reducing HAC incidence by placing the financial burden of treating HACs on the provider rather than on Medicare. The policy targeted eight conditions, which were either high cost or high volume and were considered to be reasonably preventable through better health care practices. When providers submitted reimbursement claims diagnosing patients with one or more of these conditions, they could indicate alongside their diagnosis whether the condition was present-on-admission (POA) or not. If the condition was not POA, it was deemed preventable and would not be reimbursed, Unfortunately, multiple sources of evidence suggest that the HAC nonpayment policy has had little impact on the rate of HACs (Lee et al. 2012 , Schuller et al. 2014 . It has been hypothesized that this may be because the financial impact of the policy was too small to influence significant change in practice (McNair et al. 2009 ). Consequently, public organizations that promote patient safety have called for stronger financial penalties (see, e.g., Health Watch USA 2011). In response, further Medicare legislation was issued in the form of the HAC Reduction Program, which created harsher penalties (starting in October 1, 2014) for providers with high HAC rates.
In this paper, we investigate an alternate explanation for the lack of improvement in HAC incidence: providers may have responded to the nonpayment policy by engaging in upcoding, the practice of biasing claims reports towards higher-paying diagnoses, rather than taking steps to reduce the true rate of HACs. In particular, providers can claim that HACs are actually presenton-admission (POA) in order to continue receiving full reimbursement. It is important to identify the extent of upcoding behavior (if it is present) because not only can it erode the effectiveness of the current nonpayment policy, but it also raises questions about the veracity of self-reported HAC rates; this is especially concerning when financial penalties are determined on the basis of this data, as is the case in the upcoming HAC Reduction Program. Such policy measures might be ineffective in the presence of significant upcoding. We note that we make no presumptions about Author: Strategic Behavior in Medicare Claims Reporting Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. 3 the intent (i.e. intentional or accidental) underlying upcoding behavior; rather, we will only focus on finding evidence for upcoding, as well as its economic and policy implications 1 .
However, upcoding is difficult to detect since a patient's true diagnosis is unobservable. Standard econometric techniques such as diff-in-diff estimates of HAC reporting rates before and after the nonpayment policy do not apply because the distinction between HACs and POAs in claims reporting did not exist prior to the nonpayment policy. Previous work has taken the approach of manual auditing of claims data, but this is a time-consuming and expensive process that produces high-variance results due to small sample sizes and the rarity of HACs. In particular, two previous studies on HAC upcoding that relied on auditing yielded conflicting results and could not be generalized to a national scale (Meddings et al. 2010 , Snow et al. 2012 ).
We approach this problem by analyzing national claims reporting statistics as a function of existing state-level adverse event reporting regulations. Our main empirical finding is that state-level regulation is simultaneously associated with increased reporting of HACs and decreased reporting of POAs. As we will argue in §2, the differential impact of state-level regulation on HAC and POA rates is strongly suggestive of upcoding. We address endogeneity concerns through the use of instrumental variables. In order to determine the consequences of upcoding, we make conservative estimates of the rate of upcoding in Medicare inpatient claims for two important conditions (central line-associated bloodstream infections (CLABSIs) and catheter-associated urinary tract infections (CAUTIs)) that have been the focus of recent federal legislation (including the CMS nonpayment policy and the HAC Reduction Program). We find that there are over 11,000 upcoded infections a year, resulting in an added annual cost burden of $200 million to Medicare for reimbursing these HACs. While this cost is small compared to other Medicare expenditures, it is important to note that this money was intended as a penalty to providers to incentivize them to reduce HAC incidence. The practice of upcoding has therefore eroded this financial incentive, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the policy. Medicare's current plan to increase penalties through the HAC Reduction
Program does not address these concerns, and may in fact exacerbate the problem since providers with high HAC rates will face even greater financial pressure to engage in upcoding. Moreover, providers who are trying to report more accurately than others will be unfairly penalized.
Our results suggest that in order for HAC reduction policies to be effective and fair, federal regulation must be introduced to induce accurate reporting. To this end, we provide two policy recommendations: (1) targeted audits based on a new measure we introduce for identifying potentially upcoding providers, and (2) federal implementation of certain features of current state-level 1 Some literature, such as Silverman and Skinner (2004) , suggests that upcoding may be intentional profit-maximizing behavior, while other literature, such as Meddings et al. (2010) , has suggested that upcoding may be a result of miscommunication between nurses and medical coders (specialized hospital staff who translate medical records to claims reports).
Author: Strategic Behavior in Medicare Claims Reporting
4
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no.
regulations that we find to be effective at eliciting truthful reporting. More broadly, we emphasize the importance of ensuring the veracity of self-reported data as Medicare moves towards additional data-driven pay-for-performance policies in the future.
Related Literature
There has been much interest in the operations management literature regarding policy design in the presence of strategic agents. For instance, prior work has studied pricing strategies with forwardlooking consumers (Li et al. 2014 ) and payment mechanisms that incentivize profit-maximizing medical providers (Fuloria and Zenios 2001) . We are interested specifically in the strategic behavior of healthcare providers in response to Medicare payment mechanisms. KC and Terwiesch (2011) find empirical evidence that specialized hospitals cherry-pick easy-to-treat patients. Similarly, Ata et al. (2013) show how the current hospice reimbursement policy may cause providers to engage in adverse selection by preferentially admitting short-lived patients. Our work focuses on providers altering their claims reporting behavior rather than patient admissions. Powell et al. (2012) study a single hospital's reimbursement patterns and find that the proportion of patients who are assigned highseverity reimbursement is reduced when physician workload is high; they attribute this change in coding behavior to time-constrained providers being unable to perform complete claims paperwork.
In contrast, we are interested in upcoding by strategic providers to increase claims reimbursement.
Previous studies in the medical literature have looked at provider upcoding behavior in response to Medicare's traditional fee-for-service system (Silverman and Skinner 2004) as well as the HAC nonpayment policy (Meddings et al. 2010 , Snow et al. 2012 . These studies identify upcoding through manual reviews of medical records by costly medical experts, and are consequently limited by small sample sizes. In contrast, our approach studies claims reporting statistics and finds evidence of upcoding occurring at a national level. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to show and quantify upcoding behavior across hospitals at a national scale.
Two of the aforementioned studies were targeted towards detecting HAC upcoding, but yielded conflicting results. Meddings et al. (2010) examined CAUTI infection reports and found that hospitals often engaged in upcoding by reporting HACs as POAs when filing claims; thus, they concluded that compliance with the CMS nonpayment policy was lacking. On the other hand, the Office of the Inspector General conducted a second study examining 5 different HACs (including CAUTIs) and found that HACs were indeed reliably reported and that there was very little evidence of upcoding (Snow et al. 2012) . Our work helps resolve this conflict by providing evidence for HAC upcoding as well as conservative estimates of its magnitude.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In §2, we present our argument for HAC upcoding in Medicare claims data based on our empirical findings. We then describe our various Consequently, we expect that providers in strongly-regulated states would report, on average, higher POA rates and lower HAC rates compared to providers subjected to fewer regulations (after risk-adjusting for appropriate confounding factors). However, we actually find the opposite effect:
providers in strongly-regulated states have lower POA reporting rates and higher HAC reporting rates (see Fig. 1 for the unadjusted reporting rates in a random sample of almost a million Medicare There are several potential explanations for the finding that providers in strongly-regulated states have lower POA reporting rates: (1) providers in weakly-regulated states may indeed have better infection detection ability, therefore reporting higher POA infection rates, (2) our risk adjustment may be biased due to unobserved variables, and the discrepancy may be because patients in weaklyregulated states are more susceptible to infection, or (3) providers in weakly-regulated states may be engaging in upcoding by untruthfully reporting non-POA infections as POA, thereby receiving increased reimbursement. In the first two cases, we expect that the higher (reported) POA rates in weakly-regulated states would be accompanied by higher (reported) HAC rates. In particular, (1) if providers in weakly-regulated states are better at detecting infections, then they should detect more
HACs as well (since the detection mechanism for these infections is the same for HACs and POAs), and (2) if patients in weakly-regulated states are more susceptible to infection, providers would also observe higher HAC rates for these patients. However, the first two explanations contradict the finding that providers in strongly-regulated states have higher HAC reporting rates. Thus, the evidence supports the third explanation: providers in weakly-regulated states are engaging in upcoding relative to providers in strongly-regulated states.
One concern in this analysis is that state adverse event regulation may be endogenous to HAC reporting rates. Specifically, states may have introduced adverse event reporting regulation directly in response to high HAC rates, in which case it is conceivable that providers in strongly-regulated states report relatively higher HAC rates. We address this issue by using an instrumental variable
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7 approach: our instruments are various measures of state taxation levels (known as the Economic Freedom Index (Ashby et al. 2010) ) which are correlated with the "strength" of a state's regulatory environment but bear no direct relationship with patient infection rates. We find our results remain consistent despite accounting for this endogeneity. A second concern is that strongly-regulated states may simply have lower quality of care, which would lead to higher HAC rates. However, we find evidence through provider-specific risk-adjusted mortality rates (a widely-used proxy for provider quality, see for e.g. Selim et al. (2002) , Forthman et al. (2010) ) that provider quality is higher in strongly-regulated states, suggesting that HAC rates in weakly-regulated states should in fact be higher. Therefore, we conclude that this concern is unlikely to impact our findings.
Datasets
In this section, we describe our various sources of data and define our key variables for the treatment effect estimation. We also discuss potential confounders and and our approach to control for these effects. We reproduce state reporting system features in Table 1 , and we list all of our controls and instruments in Table 2 . We report summary statistics of all our variables in Table 3 .
Data Sources
Our main sources of data were Medicare inpatient claims data and state adverse event system classification by the OIG. We also use zipcode-level census data and Medicare provider data from Hospital Compare 2 for controls, and data on state-level economic freedom indices for instruments. Our dataset contains records on 3,865,734 inpatient stays over the four years. Each inpatient stay record includes anonymized beneficiary and provider IDs, diagnoses (ICD-9 codes) and procedures associated with the stay, patient demographic information, and claims and billing information.
Patients (i.e., beneficiaries) are assigned unique IDs, allowing them to be tracked across multiple inpatient stays over the four-year period. This allows us to compute health risk measures for individual patients based on claims histories.
The unit of observation is an individual Medicare inpatient stay. We perform our treatment effect estimation on inpatient stays in 2009-10. However, we use a rolling two-year window of claims histories to compute various measures of patient risk for each inpatient stay, and so data from
2007-08 are used indirectly. We also limit our sample to short stays under the prospective payment system served by providers in the United States (which is the healthcare setting that was targeted by the nonpayment policy) as well as patients with at least one prior Medicare inpatient stay in the past 24 months (the length of our rolling window) so that we can better assess patient risk. We note that these filters affect all states uniformly, and therefore do not create bias in our analysis. 
Treatment Variable
One possible definition of the treatment variable is simply having an adverse event reporting system. Interestingly, our results show that merely having an adverse event reporting system did not have a significant effect on POA and HAC claims reporting rates for CLABSIs and CAUTIs (see Table 7 ). This is because the quality of the reporting systems varied widely from state to state.
Instead, our approach is to look for states that impose meaningful requirements on the quality of the reporting. We construct a treatment variable that is an indicator for whether the provider is located in a state that had strong regulations on adverse event reporting prior to the federal nonpayment policy in 2008.
As previously noted, we use data from an OIG report which lists each state's information reporting requirements (see Section 3.1.2). We are particularly interested in regulation that enforced truthful reporting. The OIG report claims that states identified cases of underreporting by "analyzing reported data, comparing hospital reports against complaints, referrals, and administrative databases, and conducting onsite audits" (Levinson 2008, pg. 4) .
These methods are greatly aided by the availability of more detailed data. In particular, we argue that the more data a state has regarding the circumstances of an adverse event, the harder it is for a provider to be untruthful about the event. Thus, we used the amount of required information reported to states in each category as a proxy for increased regulatory pressure for truthful reporting. For simplicity, we chose the most informative reporting requirement from each of the three information categories (see Table 1 ), namely, We define our treatment variable based only on these three reporting requirements, which helps us better interpret our results in order to make concrete policy suggestions. Since there are many other ways to define the treatment variable, we perform a robustness check where we consider several alternate definitions of the treatment variable that yield consistent results (see Section 4.4.1). This alleviates the concern that a particular definition of the treatment variable gave rise to our results by chance.
In order to construct the treatment variable, we compute a binary 3 "strength" for each state's regulation of its adverse event reporting system based on the number of these three features adopted. The median state with a reporting system adopted one of these features so we considered the set of strongly-regulated states to be those with two or more of these features. According to this definition, the strongly-regulated states were CT, FL, MA, MN, NJ, NY, RI, and SD.
Thus, we defined a binary treatment variable S for providers:
• S = 0: Provider was located in a weakly-regulated state, i.e. either had no adverse event reporting system, or had an adverse event reporting system that had zero or one of the reporting requirements described above.
• S = 1: Provider was located in a strongly-regulated state, i.e. had an adverse event reporting system with two or more of the reporting requirements described above.
Outcome Variables
We focus on CLABSIs and CAUTIs, the only two conditions directly targeted by both the HAC nonpayment policy and the recent HAC Reduction Program. We define two outcome variables:
• P OA i is an indicator variable for whether either a CLABSI or a CAUTI was diagnosed along with the present-on-admission indicator in the claims record for inpatient stay i
• HAC i is an indicator variable for whether either a CLABSI or a CAUTI was diagnosed without the present-on-admission indicator in the claims record for inpatient stay i
Controls
We define a variety of controls to account for potential confounders.
3.4.1. Patient Risk. States that implement strong regulation for HACs are likely to have also implemented other measures towards improving population health; this may, in turn, affect downstream patient infection rates. To account for this effect, we control for an extensive list of patient-specific factors that are computed from their claims histories. Age, sex, and race are obtained from MedPAR's summarized beneficiary demographic information. We use a rolling window of 6 months of each patient's claims history to identify risk-associated quantities such as the number of days since the patient's last admission, the number of prior admissions, the number of prior procedures performed on the patient during those admissions, the number of previous CLABSI and/or CAUTI infections sustained during that time, and the total length of hospital stay days. These quantities can be directly assessed from the MedPAR data.
We also use patient history to compute the Charlson comorbidity index, which predicts the likelihood of patient mortality within 6 months (Deyo et al. 1992) ; the Charlson score is a widelyaccepted measure of patient risk in the medical community. where j is the index of the provider and T j is the set of all inpatient stays under the care of provider j. This heuristic is intended to capture the provider's aggressiveness in obtaining reimbursement.
3.4.4. Provider Quality. Low-quality providers may be associated with higher HAC rates due to lapses in quality and lower POA rates due to patient choice (a sicker patient with a presenton-admission infection may choose to admit herself with a higher quality provider). We account for this effect by including provider-level risk-adjusted pneumonia mortality rates in our control set. We chose pneumonia because it is associated with significant catheter use (and therefore catheter-associated infections as well) and is one of 3 conditions for which Medicare published provider-specific mortality rates in that time period.
Instrumental Variables
Our treatment variable may potentially be endogenous if states passed regulation on adverse event reporting in response to high HAC rates and poor provider quality. We address this issue through the use of instrumental variables for our HAC analysis. Note that high POA rates cannot have impacted a state's decision to regulate since these adverse event reporting systems targeted hospital-acquired conditions and, to the best of our knowledge, there were no state agencies that even collected information on present-on-admission infection rates. Thus, we only use an instrumental variable approach for our analysis of HAC rates.
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Following the example of Mukamel et al. (2012), we use all three areas of the Economic Freedom
Index as our instruments. States with strong adverse event regulation tend to have a smaller size of government (Area 1) and are more stringent with respect to takings and discriminatory taxation (Area 2) and labor market freedom (Area 3). Summary statistics are reported in Table 3 .
We believe these instruments meet the necessary conditions that they are (i) correlated with the treatment variable (states with a stronger government presence, i.e. less economic freedom, tend to have more stringent regulations on patient adverse event reporting) and (ii) uncorrelated with HAC infection rates except through the treatment variable and controls.
We check the first condition through a weak identification test, but the second condition cannot be verified empirically. However, there is no evidence of a direct relationship between a state's level of economic freedom and hospital-acquired infection rates. Moreover, since we are using more instruments than endogenous variables, we perform an overidentification test that helps support the validity of this condition.
Type Variable Definition Variable Name
Patient-Level Age age Sex: male, female sex x Race: white, black, asian, hispanic, native american, race x other, unknown Charlson 6-month comorbidity score charlson Days since last admission (up to 6 months) days since Number of prior admissions in the last 6 months num admit Number of prior procedures in the last 6 months num prcdr Number of prior CLABSIs in the last 6 months num clbi Number of prior CAUTIs in the last 6 months num cauti Number of days of hospital stay in the last 6 months tot los 
Estimation & Results
We take a treatment effect estimation approach to determine the causal effects of strong state regulation through adverse event reporting systems on Medicare POA and HAC claims reporting rates for CLABSIs and CAUTIs.
We apply regression techniques under a linear model 4 to determine the effects of strong state regulation in adverse event reporting on POA and HAC reporting rates. We find that the presence of strong state regulation of adverse event reporting was associated with decreased POA rates and increased HAC rates. As argued in Section 2, this suggests that states with weak or no regulations are engaging in upcoding behavior by reporting HAC infections as POAs in Medicare claims.
POA Regression
Let C i denote the vector of controls (including an intercept term) for inpatient stay i. We use a linear model with the econometric specification:
where i is the error term. The coefficient of interest is β
P OA S
, which represents the effect of strong state regulation on POA reporting rates. Specifically, if β P OA S is negative, this would indicate that after controlling for potential confounders, providers in states with strong regulations have a lower probability of reporting POAs than providers in states with little or no regulation.
The standard OLS estimator makes the assumption that all errors in the P OA model are homoskedastic and independent. However, this is unlikely to be the case as hospital stays served by the same provider may have correlated heteroskedastic errors due to unobserved provider-specific variables. To account for this, we cluster our data at the provider level, and use cluster-robust standard errors that relax our assumptions to allow both arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within-provider correlation. (In §5.2, we perform a robustness check with coarser state-level clustering and confirm that our results remain significant.)
The regression coefficients, and robust standard errors clustered by provider are shown in Table 4 .
Our results show that, after controlling for patient risk, provider-specific, and demographic factors, strong state regulation on adverse event reporting is associated with significantly lower POA reporting rates (p = 7.2 × 10 −7 ).
HAC Regression
Let I i denote the vector of instrumental variables for inpatient stay i. We use two-stage least squares (2-SLS) to estimate a linear model with instruments. In the first stage, we fit our endogenous
In the second stage, we fit our outcome variable using the predictedŜ i from the first stage Once again, we use cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the provider level. We also perform weak-and over-identification tests to support the validity of our chosen instruments.
Our results show that, after controlling for patient risk, provider-specific, and demographic factors, strong state regulation on adverse event reporting is associated with significantly higher HAC reporting rates (p = 1.4 × 10 −2 ). at the 10% level), indicating that our instruments are not weak (Baum 2007) . Moreover, our overidentification test produced a Hansen J statistic of 0.374 with a χ 2 p-value 0.83; thus we failed to reject the null hypothesis that our model is correctly specified, lending credence to the validity of our instruments. Finally, we performed an endogeneity test on the treatment variable and found evidence (p = 0.02) rejecting the null hypothesis that the treatment variable is exogenous with respect to HAC outcomes; this result justifies our instrumental variable approach.
Tests of Instrument Validity
Loss Estimates
We estimate lower bounds on the number of annually upcoded CLABSIs and CAUTIs among Medicare inpatient stays in the United States, as well as the associated costs to Medicare. We take the number of upcoded infections to be the relative excess of POA reports by providers in weakly-regulated states. This implicitly makes two conservative assumptions:
1. Providers in strongly-regulated states engage in no upcoding *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 Table 4 Results of regressions. Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors (SE) of coefficients for (1) OLS regression of POA reports and (2) 2-SLS regression of HAC reports against strength of state reporting system and controls.
All providers have similar capabilities for infection detection
We believe our estimates are conservative since providers in strongly-regulated states likely have better infection detection due to the increased investigative and reporting requirements as discussed earlier.
In this case, the number of excess POA reports by weakly-regulated providers is larger than what we estimate. Secondly, it is unlikely that providers in strongly-regulated states do not engage in upcoding at all; in this case, the overall amount of upcoding is again larger than our estimate.
We perform two linear regressions on CLABSI-POA and CAUTI-POA outcomes respectively.
We find the absolute value of the treatment effects, i.e. excess POA reporting rates, of:
• CLABSI-POA: 2.28 × 10 −4 with standard error 1.08 × 10 −4
• CAUTI-POA: 1.45 × 10 −3 with standard error 2.54 × 10 on the number of upcoded POA reports claimed annually by weakly-regulated states for each condition (see Table 5 ).
We also obtain estimates of Medicare's added reimbursement cost burden from these infections from Umscheid et al. (2011) . They find that CLABSIs result in an estimated incremental cost of $110,800 (95% CI: $22,700 -$327,000) on average, and CAUTIs result in an estimated incremental cost of $2950 (95% CI: $1200 -$4700 Thus, we estimate a total of 11,369 upcoded infections with an associated cost burden of $200 million in annual Medicare reimbursements.
Policy Comparison
We defined our original treatment variable based on three reporting requirements that we considered informative. We now alter the definition of the treatment variable based on reporting requirements along three dimensions: patient, event, and cause (see Table 1 ). This serves two purposes:
• We show that our results are robust to the choice of treatment variable as long as it captures the stringency of regulations on truthful reporting.
• We draw inferences about which types of reporting requirements may be most effective at reducing upcoding behavior.
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Alternative Definitions of Treatment Variable
We construct alternative definitions of the treatment variable through the following procedure. For every combination of patient/event/cause, we consider the relevant set of reporting requirements and compute the median number implemented by the states with adverse event reporting systems (see Table 6 ). We define all states with more than the median number of requirements as "strongly regulated." We also investigate an alternative definition where a strongly-regulated state is one that simply has an adverse event reporting system. These states include CA, CO, CT, DC, FL, GA, IN, KS, ME, MD, MA, MN, NJ, NV, NY, OH, OR, PA, RI, SC, SD, TN, UT, VT, WA, and WY.
Treatment
For each of these definitions of the treatment variable, we ran a linear regression and a 2-SLS regression for POA and HAC outcomes respectively, as described in Sections 4.1-4.2. We list the estimated treatment effect along with cluster-robust standard errors and p-values in Table 7 . The "Original" definition refers to the measure that was defined and used earlier in the paper. is not associated with significant changes in reporting rates or upcoding behavior. These findings support the hypothesis that laws cannot create proper incentives without sufficient accountability.
Second, we infer that reporting patient information is most valuable, while only reporting information on the event has limited value. This may be because reporting patient information (such as the medical record number) may allow state entities to more easily audit hospital records. Our findings also suggest that reporting along all three dimensions is best; in particular, reporting patient, event, and cause information was associated with the highest reduction in upcoding.
Robustness Checks
We perform two robustness checks to provide further evidence justifying our assumptions and to show that that our empirical results are consistent under alternate specifications.
Provider Quality Variation
As noted earlier in Section 2, one source of endogeneity is provider quality. In particular, stronglyregulated states may have higher HAC rates due to low provider quality. To address this issue, we checked how risk-adjusted mortality rates (which are the most direct measure of provider quality) varied between strongly-and weakly-regulated states. During 2009-10, Medicare publicly reported these rates for three conditions: heart attack, heart failure, and pneumonia. We performed a t-test of provider-specific risk-adjusted mortality rates to compare provider quality in strongly-vs. weaklyregulated states. Results are shown in Table 8 . We find that strongly-regulated states have lower risk-adjusted mortality rates across all 3 conditions with high statistical significance. Therefore, it is unlikely that they report relatively higher HAC rates due to relatively poor provider quality. 
Condition
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Regression Specification
In addition to checking the robustness of our results to different definitions of the treatment variable ( §4.4), we also ensure that our results are consistent under alternative regression specifications:
1. Since the outcomes are binary, we use a probit model specification rather than a linear model.
2. We use a continuous (rather than binary) definition of the treatment variable. We define the treatment variable to simply be the number of total reporting requirements (out of 14) adopted by each state (see Table 1 ).
3. We employ coarser state-level (rather than provider-level) clustering of standard errors.
Coarser clustering is believed to yield more conservative estimates (Cameron and Miller 2015) .
We redo our POA and HAC analyses (as decribed in §4.1-4.2) under each of these alternative specifications. Again, we find that our results are consistent (see Table 9 ). 0.024 Table 9 Point estimates and cluster-robust standard errors for the coefficient of the treatment variable are shown for alternative specifications of the POA and HAC regressions.
Discussion & Concluding Remarks
Our results show that providers in states with stronger regulations on adverse event reporting have (1) lower risk-adjusted POA rates and (2) higher risk-adjusted HAC rates for CLABSIs and
CAUTIs. This effect is statistically significant even after controlling for a wide range of patient-level, provider-level, and demographic characteristics as well as arbitrary intra-provider correlations and endogeneity of regulation for HAC outcomes. While the POA results can potentially be explained by weakly-regulated states having better infection detection capabilities or more susceptible patients, these explanations are not consistent with the HAC results. In particular, both better infection detection and increased patient susceptibility should translate to higher HAC rates in weaklyregulated states as well. It could be argued that providers in weakly-regulated states have lower HAC rates due to better quality of care. However, we find that risk-adjusted mortality rates (a widely-used proxy for provider quality) for all conditions reported by Medicare are significantly lower for providers in strongly-regulated states, making it unlikely that they have lower quality facilities. Thus, the empirical evidence suggests that providers in weakly-regulated states were upcoding during the sample period by reporting HACs as POAs. In particular, we conservatively
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estimate that over 11,000 infections were upcoded per year, resulting in an added annual cost burden of $200 million to Medicare reimbursements.
Our work suggests that financial incentives alone are not sufficient to reduce HAC incidence; these policies must be accompanied by regulation to enforce truthful reporting. This hypothesis is supported by recent evidence that the nonpayment policy has not reduced HAC rates (Lee et al. 2012 ). In fact, increasing financial incentives (e.g. HAC Reduction Program) or reputation incentives (e.g. published infection rates on Hospital Compare) may worsen the problem as providers may simply increase their rate of upcoding. Increased upcoding would have a number of negative consequences:
1. Truthful providers are unfairly penalized and face greater financial pressure to upcode as well 2. Upcoding biases medical records resulting in a loss of accurate information. This interferes with tracking harmful conditions and evaluating the effectiveness of policies aimed at improving quality (Saint et al. 2009) 3. Publishing biased quality metrics may harm patients by routing them to providers who are engaging in upcoding rather than providing better quality of care
Thus, we recommend that CMS implement measures to enforce truthful reporting by providers.
To this end, our results suggest two policy recommendations to help mitigate upcoding. First, we suggest that CMS perform targeted audits of providers with a high POA-to-HAC reporting ratio.
As discussed in §2, providers with higher risk-adjusted POA reporting rates and lower risk-adjusted HAC reporting rates are more likely to be engaging in HAC upcoding. Second, we recommend that the federal government implement certain features of current state-level regulations that we find to be effective at eliciting truthful reporting. Our analysis establishes the causal effect of stronger regulation on decreased upcoding, and helps isolate some of the state adverse event reporting system features that were successful in reducing upcoding. These include reporting patient-identifying information (medical record number or billing number), a detailed description of the adverse event,
as well as the identified root cause of the adverse event. On the other hand, we note that simply having a reporting system without stringent requirements produced no significant effect on reporting rates; we find that it is crucial that the regulation creates sufficient provider accountability.
We hypothesize that simply requiring providers to report detailed information on how and why an adverse event occurred forces providers to implement the necessary infrastructure for detecting and preventing HACs. Moreover, reporting more detailed information increases the threat of setting off red flags when upcoding, and thus possibly diminishes the rate of upcoding. CMS may benefit by implementing such detailed information reporting requirements in addition to existing financial incentives to help improve hospital infrastructure and truthful reporting nationally. These
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measures are especially important as Medicare moves towards more pay-for-performance policies that rely on self-reported quality metrics.
